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ENRICHMENT SERIESt
Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
Why Do We Need Them?
ROBERT J. KUTAK*
I am delighted to- have this opportunity to be at the University of
Oklahoma College of Law to discuss the proposed ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct. As you might imagine, as chairman of the
ABA Commission that drafted the Model Rules, I have spent many
hours during the past year on the road speaking at bar associations
and law schools much like this one to explain their scope and rationale.
In my travels I have been fortunate to have been in contact with
a wide cross-section of the profession and academia and to hear their
concerns about legal ethics and self-regulation in our profession. Of
course, I have discovered a great diversity in the profession-diversity
in the kinds of practice lawyers are involved in, diversity in the way
lawyers organize to practice, and diversity in expectations about the
future of the profession. But I also discovered a few constants that
relate to the work of the Commission. By and large, lawyers in this
country are truly dedicated to practicing law in the finest traditions
of the profession. Contrary to what one reads in biting or bitter columns
that appear in the papers from time to time, the members of this pro-
fession are willing and able to work together to regulate themselves
in the public interest.
I have also had confirmed in my travels that most lawyers and
scholars do not find the 1969 ABA Code of Professional Responsibility
to be a satisfactory tool of self-regulation or a useful guide to profes-
sionally responsible conduct. They find it difficult to use the current
Code to resolve specific problems-the real-life dilemmas that arise
in the daily practice of law. They find the current Code's three-part
structure of Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules
cumbersome and confusing. They find the current Code's tendency
f This is an address presented at the University of Oklahoma College of Law on November
3, 1982, as an Enrichment Program Lecture.
* Chairman, American Bar Association Commission on Evaluation of Professional Stan-
dards.-Ed.
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to focus so heavily on less important matters-such as the prohibition
about advertising the practice of law-disappointing.'
Nevertheless, I have also found that most lawyers are instinctively
skeptical of a new set of rules. I attribute this in part to the instinct
for caution that is characteristic of the bar. It is an instinct that has
always dictated thorough study, debate, and multiple drafts before any
document is given final approval, whether it be new public law or private
law as expressed in a contract.
Why did the American Bar Association Commission produce a new
set of rules in the first place? Would not an appropriate series of amend-
ments have been sufficient? These are legitimate questions and cer-
tainly appropriate ones to ask before we consider the merits of the
Model Rules and explore the thinking which lies behind them. Therefore,
before discussing some of the proposed new rules, let me attempt to
remove the skepticism with which they may be initially greeted by ex-
plaining the motives of those who drafted them.
The simplest way to do this is to review the record-the history-of
our profession's efforts at developing rules of self-governance. By the
way, many others-I think particularly of Professor Forrest Bowman-
have done so. in recent months. The insights are revealing.2
We start as far back as the 1830s, when a Baltimore lawyer, David
Hoffman, published his "Fifty Resolutions." These were high-minded
statements of what we today would recognize as ethical principles.
Written in a kind of preachy, victorian tone, they were, according to
Hoffman, to be recited twice each year by lawyers, an exercise that
would presumably raise the ethical level of conduct of those who under-
took it. As naive as all this sounds today, it was by and large then
the only source material with regard to professional responsibility.
In the 1850s, however, a Philadelphia judge and professor at the
University of Pennsylvania's law school, George Sharswood, set about
to remedy this situation. This was, it will be recalled, some years before
Christopher Columbus Langdell came to Harvard and made our lives
vastly more complicated by the publication of his casebook on con-
tracts. Before then, legal education-where it was found in a univer-
sity setting at all-had been largely a matter of lectures. Judge
Sharswood's approach to legal ethics therefore took the form of a lec-
ture, or actually a series of lectures, which through several editions,
1. See, e.g., McGrew, ABA Evades Duty to Update Code of Responsibility, LEOAL TIMES,
Oct. 18, 1981, p. 13.
2. Bowman, The Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct: What Hath the ABA
Wrought?, 13 PAC. L.J. 273 (1982). See especially pp. 274 to 286 for the historical materials




had a large impact on that portion of the bar that concerned itself
with professional ethics.
One member of the bar who must be counted among them was
Thomas Jones of Alabama. Governor Jones-as he eventually became
governor of Alabama-read his Sharswood well. But he took Sharswood
out of the classroom and brought him, in a sense, to the courtroom
by drafting what was to become the first true code of ethics in the
United States: the Alabama Code of 1887.
Other states got into the spirit of things, and by 1906, ten had
adopted, with minor variations,-the 1887 Alabama Code. By 1908 the
American Bar Association, following the work of a committee of the
ABA among whose members was Governor Jones, proposed for adop-
tion the ABA Canons of Ethics, founded largely on the 1887 Alabama
Code.
Now, without doing damage to the historical record, one may jump
ahead, from 1908 to the mid-1960s, when the then President of the
ABA, Mr. Lewis Powell-now, of course, Mr. Justice Powell-called
for a revision of the Canons and was answered with the 1969 Model
Code of Professional Responsibility.
The "new" Code certainly looked new. It propounded its contents
in a three-part division. That is, it had Nine Canons-general maxims,
really-each followed, as you know, by a number of statements called
"Ethical Considerations," which in turn were followed by the statute-
like Disciplinary Rules.
Contained in the Disciplinary Rules of the 1969 Code was a real
achievement. For the drafters of that Code, by separating out the general
maxims of the Canons and the hortatory, aspirational Ethical Consid-
erations had, in the Disciplinary Rules, brought the bar to the realization
that, within the broad arena of legal ethics and professional respon-
sibility, there was a fundamental level where one could find not exhor-
tations to goodness and a high-toned morality but actual law, the law
of lawyering, rules of conduct that look like, sound like, and perform
like any other body of law.
But, it must be said, the potential force of that achievement was
not fully realized in the 1969 Code. For, it has been noted, despite
its radically different appearance from the documents that preceded
it, the 1969 Code actually changed the 1908 Canons in only four points
of substance.'
The implications of this are extraordinary. For it means that the 1969
Code was still essentially the 1908 Canons. The Canons, in turn, were
an outgrowth of the 1887 Alabama Code. And the Alabama Code may
3. Id. at 286.
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be read in great part as a codification of lectures in the 1850s by a
fine old judge in Philadelphia who presumably thought the bar could
do better than reciting, twice a year, the Resolutions of David Hoffman.
One would look long and hard and futilely for another body of law
that had seen so much and apparently changed so little. The record
of the bar in adopting and adapting its governing rules has not been,
as one commentator has said, "a record of unseemly haste.
' 4
That is the situation, or was the situation, the Commission discovered
as it undertook its assignment. We have a Code that does not respond
to the realities of the modem-day practice nor to the needs of the public,
as well as the needs of our profession.
Our response to such realities-to those needs-is found in what
is now called the revised final draft of the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct. We submitted the draft to the House of Delegates on
June 30, 1982, after virtually five years of studying, writing, listening to
comments and criticisms, restudying, rewriting, and, of course, even-
tually publishing our text.
As submitted, the revised final draft consists of a Table of Con-
tents, a Preamble, a Scope Note, and the text of the Rules and accom-
panying comments. All of this has been published in the November,
1982 issue of the American Bar Association Journal, along with a com-
parison of the provisions of the current Code of Professional Respon-
sibility to aid readers who wish to compare the text of a Model Rule
with its counterpart section in the 1969 Model Code.
As members of the ABA House of Delegates, the profession, and
the public at large continue to review the Model Rules, a note about
what the Model Rules are and are not is in order.
The Model Rules are, first and foremost, intended to serve as a na-
tional model of the regulatory law-enforceable standards of conduct-'
governing the practice of law. As a "national model," the Model Rules
have been drafted to articulate the consensus of the profession on a
wide range of issues of professional conduct-from competence and
communication to corporate representation and client confidentiality.
Consensus, however, rarely if ever speaks with the voice of unanimity.
Differences in emphasis are to be expected, as are strongly held and
sometimes irreconcilable differences of view. A national model law can
never accommodate all such differences and remain internally consis-
tent and coherent. Moreover, some latitude must remain for adapta-
tion of the national model to local tradition, outlook, and practice.
The test for evaluating a national model must be whether, given in-
evitable local adaptation, the document taken as a whole reflects what




should and will be acceptable as the prevailing view in the vast majority
of jurisdictions.
As "regulatory law" the Model Rules are, at a very minimum, in-
tended for use in carrying out the disciplinary side of our profession's
self-regulatory process. Accordingly, the Model Rules consist of enforce-
able standards presented in the form of a series of directives and pro-
hibitions, accompanied by discretionary standards marking out "safe
harbors," areas in which a lawyer may safely make reasoned judg-
ments without fear of regulatory penalty. There can be no question but
that our profession-perhaps more so than any other-is seriously com-
mitted to self-regulation and the enforcement of its professional
standards.
But, as disciplinary committees and bar counsel would be the first
to acknowledge, self-regulation of a profession having more than 500,000
members demands more than enforcement through disciplinary pro-
ceedings. The primary mechanism for effective self-regulation must be
widespread voluntary compliance with the profession's standards of
conduct. And widespread voluntary compliance in turn requires clear,
workable, common-sense standards by which individual lawyers can
regulate their own conduct. The Model Rules provide such standards
in an integrated text organized for convenient reference by the lawyer
who is not an expert in legal ethics.
The Model Rules have not, however, been written solely with a view
toward application to those few lawyers who are unwilling to adhere
to professional standards or those additional few who would not act
professionally absent the threat of disciplinary penalty. Our profession's
standards must be more than a penal code, for they have an equally
vital informative role to perform. Although there will always be a few
who look to the profession's standards to determine how to avoid or
minimize their exposure to disciplinary liability, it must be recognized
that the overwhelming majority of lawyers look to those standards to
determine the right course-the professionally responsible course-of
action in response to a specific question arising in their daily practice.
Generalized norms, such as a lawyer should avoid the "appearance
of impropriety,"'s should "exercise independent professional judg-
ment,' 6 or should "represent a client zealously within the bounds
of law, ' 7 offer little assistance to the conscientious lawyer. By setting
forth the law and the best of professional traditions in discrete and
specific standards identifying the matters that the conscientious lawyer
S. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmLITY [hereinafter MODEL CODE], Canon 9 (1979).
6. Id., Canon 5.
7. Id., Canon 7.
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would consider in resolving a question of professional responsibility,
the Model Rules truly provide a handbook of good lawyering-a guide
to those many lawyers who earnestly seek to practice in a professionally
responsible way.
Taken as a whole, the revised final draft now before the ABA House
of Delegates reflects on every page the thoughtful study and hard work
of the sections and committees of the Association, and of state and
local bar organizations throughout the country. The Model Rules are
thus truly national in derivation. As proposed national model stan-
dards, the Model Rules, like all model legislation, will be subject to
any necessary modification at the level of local implementation. But
at the national level, the Model Rules speak from a broader perspective
developed during thirty months of public reaction to successive drafts,
and reflect the leadership the American Bar Association has exercised
for some seventy-five years in recommending national standards of pro-
fessional responsibility.
What are the Model Rules not about? Despite generalized and
somewhat emotionally charged claims of a few, the Model Rules are
most assuredly not an attempt to dilute the fiduciary relationship that
exists between lawyer and client. Indeed, it may fairly be said that
never before has there been a lhore client-centered code. Time and again,
in areas of paramount importance to clients-competence, promptness,
diligence, communication, fees, and loyalty-the Model Rules are
drafted in a manner purposefully designed to strengthen fundamental
obligations to the client.
Nor do the Model Rules make sweeping, radical, or dangerous
changes in the traditional rules of confidentiality. The most effective
way to answer a charge that they do make such changes is to ask readers
to compare the language of the Model Rules with existing law and exist-
ing standards of professional responsibility. On the basis of such com-
parison it can fairly be said that the Model Rules actually take a more
conservative approach to confidentiality and a more restrictive approach
to disclosure than do existing codes of professional responsibility
adopted in the vast majority of jurisdictions.
As to confidentiality, the starting point in the Model Rules is expan-
sion of the scope of the general obligation. The Model Rules do not
use the existing code classification of "confidences" and "secrets" and
the related distinction regarding information "embarrassing" to the
client.' The Model Rules assume that clients initially expect that all
information relating to the representation will be protected.9 With regard
8. Id., DR 4-101(A).




to exceptions to the principle of confidentiality, the Model Rules, like
the 1969 Code, like every predecessor code, and like every scholar who
has written on the issue, recognize that the general obligation of confi-
dentiality has outer limits where transcendent values must prevail over
secrecy.
The Model Rules are different primarily in that exceptions to confi-
dentiality are more narrowly drawn. For example, existing codes in
38 states require a lawyer to disclose any unrectified fraud committed
by a client in the course of representation." In contrast, the Model
Rules recognize that the critical question for purposes of mandatory
disclosure is not whether a crime or fraud was committed during the
course of representation, but whether disclosure by the lawyer is
necessary to avoid assisting that crime or fraud-law does not permit
lawyers to serve as co-conspirators with clients, nor to aid and abet
crime or fraud."
The Model Rules also effectively narrow the scope of discretionary
disclosure provided in the 1969 Code. The 1969 Code permits disclosure
of any intended crime, including the crime of fraud.'2 The Model Rules
seek to replace that broad grant with a rule permitting disclosure of
otherwise confidential information only to the extent necessary to pre-
vent a crime or fraud that is likely to result in grave personal injury
or death or substantial economic loss.3 Thus, the simplistic test of
the 1969 Code is replaced by a more restrictive formula requiring, first,
an analysis of the nature of the client's conduct; second, an assessment
of the likely consequences of that conduct; and third, an evaluation
of the extent to which disclosure is necessary to prevent those conse-
quences.
Narrowing the scope of mandatory and discretionary disclosure per-
mitted by the 1969 Code requires consideration of one additional case-
that of the lawyer who has been deceived by a client and unknowingly
assisted the client's crime or fraud. It should be borne in mind that
such cases would be treated as instances of mandatory disclosure under
the 1969 Code. In the Model Rules, this problem is treated as a matter
of discretionary disclosure and limited to crimes or frauds in furtherance
of which the lawyer's services have actually been used.'"
The charge that the confidentiality provisions of the Model Rules
represent a radical departure from existing standards in favor of more
disclosure simply cannot withstand comparison to existing codes and
10. ABA, CODE OF PRomsiONAL RIESPONSIBILITY BY STATE (1980).
11. See MODEL RumES, supra note 9, Rules 3.3, 4.1.
12. MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 4-101(C)(3).
13. MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.6.
14. Id.
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existing law. Likewise, the broader and even more generalized charge
that the Model Rules seek to undermine the adversary system loses
much of its rhetorical steam when tested against the actual text of the
Model Rules and the provisions of the 1969 Code. In general, the Model
Rules do no more than recognize that the adversary system is a con-
trolled process governed by rules applicable to lawyers as well as to
clients and their adversaries.
For example, strenuous objection has been made by a few to a provi-
sion (Rule 3.3(a)(3)) that requires limited disclosure of legal authority
in the controlling jurisdiction known to be directly adverse and not
disclosed by opposing counsel. The provision is taken directly from
the 1969 Code and is neither new nor radical." Similarly, the Model
Rules continue existing standards that prohibit lawyer presentation of
evidence known to be false, lawyer participation in obstructions of
justice (jury tampering, falsification or concealment of evidence, and
the like), abusive trial conduct, and assistance in fraud upon a tribunal.6
A response to the more generalized charges that have been leveled
is not to suggest that the Model Rules are perfect, or that reasonable
and principled alternatives to specific Model Rules cannot be formulated.
One thing lawyers can agree upon is that no legislative document is
ever really perfect. While founded on law, the Model Rules are in-
formed by experience and, therefore, the product of compromise as
well. Thirteen members of a commission, let alone 387 members of
the House of Delegates, let alone 500,000 members of a profession,
are bound to have disagreements and bound to discover issues that
can honorably be argued on either side and honorably resolved in dif-
ferent ways.
For its part, the Commission has truly sought, to the extent possible
within the confines of legal principle, sound public policy, and the over-
riding goal of formulating a national model, to accommodate the sug-
gestions and differing views communicated by others. The best evidence
of that accommodation will be found in the revisions that were made
by the Commission first to the January, 1980 discussion draft and then
to the 1981 proposed final draft of the Model Rules.
Despite the Commission's best efforts, some views could not be ac-
commodated. In some instances, those views have been expressed in
the form of amendments that reflect local priorities and outlooks that
seem ill-suited to a national model. Others have been expressed in
amendments urging directly opposing positions on issues on which the
proposed Model Rule already sets forth the compromise position.
15. MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 7-106(B).




I dare say I am not the most objective or disinterested commentator
on the proposed Model Rules. However, I propose to you that the
revised final draft is an honest, forward-looking, responsible document
that has emerged after a thorough testing at the hands of individual
lawyers and bar associations throughout the country. It is a conser-
vative document in the truest sense of the word, for it aims to preserve
and enhance fundamental professional values in the face of a rapidly
expanding and changing profession.
In reviewing the Model Rules, all of us-the Commission, the pro-
ponents of amendments, the members of the House of Delegates,
lawyers across the nation-share the same goal: the achievement of
the best possible national model standards of professional conduct.
As chairman of the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Stan-
dards, I commend the revised final draft of the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct of the American bar to you as a document worthy
of a proud profession, jealous of its independence, and committed to
its tradition of self-regulation.
1983]
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